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Introduction  
 
The public outcry against the National Security Agency’s (NSA) 
collection of data on U.S. citizens, revealed by Edward Snowden’s leak, focused 
almost entirely on the USA Patriot Act signed into law by President George W. 
Bush in 2001.1 News media demanded greater congressional oversight, 
questioned the statute’s implementation and interpretation, and called for judicial 
intervention. Yet, many are unaware that the vast majority of the NSA’s 
controversial power should not be attributed to the Patriot Act, but rather, to an 
executive order signed into law by President Ronald Reagan in 1981.2 Executive 
Order 12333 is not a statute, and therefore has never been put to a congressional 
vote or been subject to judicial review by any court.3 Nonetheless, Executive 
Order 12333 has the full force and effect of law, authorizing the NSA to collect 
the telephone records of tens of millions of American citizens.4  
Executive orders have gained unprecedented attention in recent years as 
presidents have increasingly relied on them when making unilateral decisions 
regarding controversial actions and policies. Due to continuous expansion of 
presidential powers, the need for more effective checks and balances from the 
other branches of government is apparent. Presidential authority has evolved to be 
almost entirely “unbounded” by law.5 This has allowed presidents from across the 
political spectrum to enjoy boundless discretion in making important decisions — 
especially regarding foreign affairs — without any cooperation with Congress. 
While an energetic executive is important to the strength of the nation, there must 
be limits imposed to guarantee this energy does not detract from the powers 
afforded to the legislative branch. As Alexander Hamilton famously wrote in the 
Federalist Papers: 
 
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of a good 
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against 
foreign attacks. Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will 
agree in the necessity of an energetic executive, it will only remain to 
inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy?6  
 
                                                        
1 Erica Newland, Executive Orders in Court, The Yale Law Journal, 2035 (2015). 
2 John Napier Tye, Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan rule that lets the NSA spy on 
Americans, The Wash. Post, July 18, 2014. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme, BBC News Online, US & Canada, 
(2014).  
5 Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 
Mich. L. Rev. 545, 546-47 (2004). 
6 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist, No. 70. 
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In establishing a clearer jurisprudence regarding presidential directives, the 
Supreme Court can restore the balance of power among the executive and 
legislative branches, and maintain the means for the people of the nation to decide 
on the ingredients constituting presidential energy.  
An overview of the history of executive order issuance and its sources of 
authority reveals the advantages and disadvantages such direct action offers 
administrations. After examining the traditional framework applied to executive 
orders by the Supreme Court, it becomes evident that the Court’s acquiescence 
and restraint has greatly increased presidential powers and has allowed it to 
encroach upon those delegated to Congress. The lack of clear jurisprudence from 
the Court has, either intentionally or unintentionally, favored presidential 
authority — particularly on foreign affairs issues. The unilateralism of recent 
presidential action in international affairs is vividly demonstrated by two concrete 
examples from the Bush and Obama Administrations. These examples show 
excessive executive authority in foreign relations, and further highlight the need 
for a more reliable Court approach to executive orders.  
 
Executive Orders  
 
Definition and Authority   
 
Presidential directives are important and powerful tools that have been 
issued since the Washington Administration.7 Although the slightest examination 
of the history of the American presidency can reveal the significant role that 
direct action tools have played in shaping the nation’s policies, there is markedly 
a lack of scholarly analysis on their use and abuse by presidents.8  
Although presidents use numerous written instruments to implement 
policy, defining them and differentiating between them has been difficult for 
academics.9 These instruments include executive orders, presidential memoranda, 
and presidential proclamations. The main approach to distinguishing between 
these directives is typically based on their respective forms, rather than on their 
substance. Out of the three, executive orders have been the most contentious, as 
they have often been issued over controversial areas. For example, in Korematsu 
v. United States (1944) the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
Executive Order 9066 issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which 
                                                        
7 Catherine M. Dwyer, The U.S. Presidency and national security directives: An overview, Journal 
of Government Information, (2003). 
8 Phillip J. Cooper, By the Order of the President The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action, 
2-76 (2002). 
9 Vivian S. Chu and Todd Gravey, Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation, 
Congressional Research Service, 1 (2014). 
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established internment camps for Japanese Americans during World War II.10 The 
only technical statutory difference between the three instruments is that the 
Federal Register Act requires all executive orders be published in the Federal 
Register.11 Thus, although it is unknown exactly how many have been issued, 
there has been an official record of all executive orders maintained by the 
government since 1935. 
Presidents have used executive orders in a plethora of ways, including, “to 
suspend habeas corpus, desegregate the military, implement affirmative action 
requirements for government contractors, institute centralized review of proposed 
agency regulations, stall stem cell research, create the nation’s first cybersecurity 
initiative, and… authorize a surveillance dragnet.”12 These orders instruct the 
officers to take action, stop an activity, modify a policy, or change certain 
practices.13 The commonly accepted official definition of executive orders 
originated from a study conducted for the House Committee on Government 
Operations in 1957:  
 
Executive orders and proclamations are directives or actions by the 
President. When they are founded on the authority of the President derived 
from the Constitution or statute, they may have the force and effect of 
law… In the narrower sense Executive orders and proclamations are 
written documents denominated as such… Executive orders are generally 
directed to, and govern actions by, Government officials and agencies. 
They usually affect private individuals only indirectly.14 
 
Given the broad range of issues covered by executive orders, there is a tendency 
to apply the term to a whole range of presidential power tools. However, at their 
most basic form, executive orders are directives issued by the President to the 
officers of the executive branch. 
An executive order, as any other presidential initiative, must derive its 
authority from a legal source. The President can root this legal authority in his 
constitutional capacity as chief executive, or in a statute. In an article for Harvard 
Law Review, now Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan explains: 
 
Presidents, of course, discovered long ago that they could use executive 
orders and similar vehicles (for example, proclamations) to take various 
                                                        
10 Ibid., 3. 
11 Available at: https://www.federalregister.gov/executive-orders 
12 See note 1 above. 
13 See note 9 above.  
14 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, Executive Orders and 
Proclamations: A Study of the Use of Presidential Power, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957.  
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unilateral actions, sometimes of considerable importance… The President 
in these cases, whether claiming authorization from a federal statute 
delegating him power or from the Constitution itself, asserted his right as 
head of the executive branch to determine how its internal processes and 
constituent units were to function.15  
 
Article II, Section I, Clause I of the U.S. Constitution declares that, “the executive 
power shall be vested in a President of the United States.”16 While Article I 
contains a long list of powers delegated to Congress, Article II sets forth a 
comparably shorter list of presidential powers. The “Vesting Clause Thesis,”17 
contends that Article II implicitly grants the President a broad range of powers, 
and has been used to justify discretionary executive action. This broad 
interpretation of the Constitution has undoubtedly contributed to the development 
of the unilateral executive.18  
The problem in interpreting and analyzing the validity of executive order 
issuance emerges from the fact that too often, the exact authority of an executive 
order is not clear. In many instances, the President’s justification includes an 
aggregation of authority from various sources, making an effective analysis of the 
source difficult. This is due to the fact that the legal source to issue executive 
orders can come from a combination of statutes and Article II of the 
Constitution.19  The difficulties arising from attempts to isolate the legal authority 
of executive orders will be discussed in greater detail (along with other challenges 
faced by the Court when reviewing presidential directives) in Part III. 
 
Traditional Framework of the Court 
 
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), the Supreme Court 
established the framework to analyze whether the issuance of an executive order 
by the President — for example, the seizure of most of the nation’s steel mills — 
constitutes a valid presidential action.20 The framework articulated by Justice 
Robert H. Jackson in his concurring opinion has been incredibly influential in 
guiding the Court’s approach to analyzing the validity of controversial actions by 
the executive.21 Justice Jackson’s tripartite approach addressed the fact that the 
                                                        
15 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. Law Rev. 2245, 2291-92 (2001). 
16 U.S. Constitution, Article II, § I, Clause I. 
17 See note 6 above.  
18Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, University 
of Maryland School of Law, 26 (2006).  
19 See note 10 above. 
20 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
21 See note 10 above. 
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President’s powers are not fixed. Instead, they ebb and flow, depending on their 
conjunction and disjunction with the powers of Congress.22 The President’s 
authority is at a maximum when he is acting pursuant to either an express or 
implied delegation from Congress. His authority is at a minimum when the 
measures he has taken are in conflict with the express or implied will of Congress.  
In the middle of the two is what Justice Jackson identified as “[the] zone 
of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, 
or in which distribution is uncertain.”23 In this gray area, the President may act 
independently, but his actions could be challenged. Thus, when Congress is silent 
on an issue, and thereby has neither denied nor granted authority to the executive 
branch, the President is free to take action. The three categories established in 
Youngstown have had tremendous impact of the development of the Court’s 
jurisprudence on presidential direct action.  
This framework is visible in numerous subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions. For example, in Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981), the Court upheld 
executive orders issued by President Jimmy Carter, which following the 
resolution of the Iran Hostage Crisis, terminated all legal proceedings in U.S. 
courts involving claims by U.S. nationals against the government of Iran.24 
Writing for the majority was Justice William H. Rehnquist, who argued that 
because the President had been delegated broad authority under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),25 such action was, “supported by the 
strongest presumption and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”26 This 
exceptionally deferential view of executive power originated from the Court’s 
opinion in Youngstown, and Justice Rehnquist’s reference cemented Justice 
Jackson’s tripartite approach.  
Although formulaically granting full deference to the President when 
Congress is silent on an issue has enabled vast expansion of presidential powers, 
the Supreme Court has not been willing to address the negative consequences of 
this decision. The limited depth of the doctrine from Youngstown continues to 
dominate the way in which the judiciary branch interprets separation of power 
issues. The limit on presidential action with respect to executive orders has been 
distorted by the Supreme Court penchant for deference to the Executive.27 This 
distortion has produced aggrandizement of presidential authority on most 
international affairs issues.  
                                                        
22 See note 21 above. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Dames & Moore v. Regan 453 US 654 (1981). 
25 See note 10 above. 
26 See note 25 above. 
27Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, University 
of Maryland School of Law, 7 (2006).  
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Advantages and Disadvantages for the Administration 
  
 From the perspective of the President, one of the main appeals of utilizing 
executive orders is their ability to circumvent the procedural restraints imposed on 
other types of lawmaking. Given that there is virtually no procedural requirement 
that the Executive must satisfy prior to the issuance of an executive order, it is 
unsurprising that these directives have been favored and used by presidents of all 
eras. Other types of legislative action and agency regulations require a 
significantly more arduous path, while executive orders, “rid the president of the 
need to assemble majorities in both houses of Congress, or wait through 
administrative processes, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, to initiate 
policy.”28  
Executive orders are also used to efficiently issue policies aimed at 
important problems; this strong and immediate momentum is especially appealing 
for a new administration.29 In emergency situations, when immediate action is 
necessary, the availability and rapidity of executive orders becomes extremely 
important. Additionally, if there is a time-sensitive problem where the President 
does not have time for traditional legislation, executive orders also serve a vital 
purpose. In times of extreme polarization and animosity in Congress, mainly due 
to partisanship, executive orders grant the President the ability to overcome the 
government deadlock and accomplish goals. Lastly, they give presidents the 
ability to demonstrate direct action on issues particularly important to them, and 
exert greater control in shaping their legacy. Although executive orders are a 
legitimate and compelling way for presidents to carry out their duties, they can 
also pose risks to the administration. 
While issuing executive orders can be an incredibly useful tool for the 
President, it nonetheless entails significant drawbacks. In general terms, these 
disadvantages include the aggravation of tensions between the branches of the 
federal government (as well as the various intergovernmental agencies), the 
weakening of the effectiveness of the President’s Cabinet, and negative backlash 
from the public. Additionally, constant reliance on executive orders can 
undermine the administrative law system by discounting more balanced forms of 
governance.30  
The administrative law processes that have been established over the years 
serve important purposes. These processes ensure that the authority of important 
policy actions remain clear. When the government bears its power on an 
individual or an organization, administrative law ensures the availability of due 
                                                        
28 Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 Iowa Law Review. 539, 552-53 (2005). 
29 See note 9 above at 69-70. 
30 See note 9 above. 
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process and a means for judicial review.31 This is jeopardized by the presidential 
practice of bypassing regular lawmaking avenues and issuing executive orders, 
which often claim its authority from an inadequately identified source.  
Phillip J. Cooper, the author of the influential book By Order of the 
President The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action (2002), surmised 
succinctly, “Few knowledgeable observers… are prepared to suggest that 
executive orders should be banned outright… the challenge is to understand what 
executive orders are, how they are used, why they are employed, what potential 
strengths they offer, and what difficulties they might engender.”32 Executive 
orders touch on individual rights, the structure of the federal government, the 
separation of powers among the branches, and thereby affect millions of 
Americans.33 Thus, the difficulties they pose are pressing and must urgently be 
addressed. The most appropriate form of oversight on executive order issuance is 
judicial review.  
 
Executive Orders as an Insurance Policy 
 
In order to concretely highlight the ways in which presidents overstep 
Congress and attempt to expand their authority beyond what has been allocated 
for the executive branch, specific examples must be examined. The George W. 
Bush and the Barack Obama presidencies present two illuminating cases. In both 
instances, the presidents were most likely acting in an unconstitutional way, but, 
by redefining legally accepted terms to suit their actions, they managed to insure 
themselves against any liability. In both circumstances, the Supreme Court was 
silent and did not review challenges to these actions.   
In 2002, the Bush Administration was at the height of its “war on terror.” 
President Bush sought ways to authorize the torture of terrorist suspects, which is 
against international and American law. The solution was to take unilateral action 
and redefine torture. In their book Unchecked and Unbalanced (2008), Aziz Z. 
Huq and Frederick A.O. Schwarz examine the President Bush’s torture policy and 
surmise that, “Torture, according to the Bush Administration, is legal because the 
president says it is.”34 The definition of torture under applicable law used to be 
“severe physical or mental pain or suffering,”35 but the order issued by President 
                                                        
31 Ibid., at 75. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See note 1 above.   
34 Aziz Z. Huq and Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Unchecked and Unbalanced, The New Press, New 
York, 202. (2008). 
3518 U.S.C. sections 2340-2340A. The Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 
were amended by John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the U.S. and signed by 
Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee who was the head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). 
They were termed the “Torture Memos” by the press.  
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Bush, with the support of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which reviews all 
executive orders and proclamations proposed by the President, modified the 
definition so that “suffering” “must be equivalent in intensity to the pain 
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily 
function, or even death.”36 By independently redefining the meaning of the word, 
President Bush was able to order the torture of terrorist suspects without any 
interference from Congress.  
The Obama Administration has also employed this form of legal jujitsu. In 
2011, President Obama decided to take part in the NATO mission supporting 
rebels in Libya. According to the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the President 
must ask Congress for authorization within 60 days of involving the U.S. military 
into “hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement into hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances.”37 President Obama refused to obtain 
authorization from Congress for the intervention in Libya. The OLC provided 
assistance in redefining “hostilities” in order to justify President Obama’s 
independent and highly controversial action. 
In both instances, the decisions of the administrations were met with 
criticism, taken by many as a clear example of unconstitutional presidential 
action.38 This type of unilateral action threatens national security and stability. 
Authors Aziz Z. Huq and Frederick A.O. Schwarz Jr., accurately conclude:  
 
Making the executive supreme makes the nation no safer — either from its 
enemies or its own worse impulses. Indeed, the abiding genius of the 
Founding Generation was its rejection of the idea that unchecked 
unilateral powers is ever properly vested in any one branch of government. 
Our government was framed to ‘control itself,’ as James Madison wrote in 
the Federalist Papers. ‘Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.’ 
Dividing the powers between three branches, the Founders harnessed 
human passions in the cause of limited government.39 
 
These episodes serve as a clear example of the weak legal constraints on 
presidential action. They also demonstrate the executive branch’s ability to evade 
checks and balances by crafting its own definitions, even if the new definitions 
contradict existing valid laws.  
The redefining of “torture” by the Bush Administration was repealed, but 
since the Obama Administration was able to continue the operation in Libya and 
defend its own definition of “hostilities,” its definition is likely to become the 
                                                        
36 Garrett Epps, Obama’s Bush-Like Approach to Executive Power, The Atlantic, (2011). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.  
39 See note 35 above at 202. 
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accepted one.40 In their article for Columbia Law Review, Curtis A. Bradley and 
Trevor W. Morrison suggest that, “As a result, actions supported by minimally 
plausible legal defenses might over time be understood to exert a gravitational 
pull on the best understanding of the law.”41 Institutional practice has played a 
central role in American foreign policy, thus the need for caution and restraint on 
behalf of the Executive is clear. Unfortunately, as the two examples illustrate, 
presidents often disregard this need.  
 
Judicial Review  
 
Bringing Executive Orders to the Court 
 
Court disputes that arise over executive orders often question the authority 
the President claims to issue the order, and whether or not it can validly be 
implied from the statute in question. Since administrations have identified and 
interpreted several statutes to offer great flexibility to a President seeking to issue 
an executive order, this discussion regarding real as opposed to claimed authority 
has become a major issue.42 
In accordance to the framework established in Youngstown, when an 
executive order is issued in conjunction to the will of Congress, it is upheld as 
valid. When it is issued against the will of Congress it is to be invalidated. And 
finally, in the absence of congressional opposition, in the “twilight zone,”43 the 
President may take independent action and issue executive orders, the validity of 
which may be challenged in courts.44 Most direct action tools that presidents 
employ are justified and legal, it is their widespread and unchecked use that has 
presented most of the difficulties.45 As history has shown, presidents will often 
exceed their authority, and in these circumstances, their actions must consistently 
be questioned. It is specifically in these instances when the need for clear and 
concise jurisprudence regarding executive orders becomes necessary.  
The Supreme Court case Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin (1974), 
illustrates how difficult it can be to isolate an executive order’s source of 
authority.46 In this case, the challenged executive order was issued to govern labor 
relations for federal employees. The Court upheld the order, finding its authority 
                                                        
40 See note 6 above at 1148. 
41 Ibid., at 1148. 
42 See note 9 above. 
43 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 
44 Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretations Outside the Courts, 87-88 (1990). 
45 See note 9 above.  
46 See note 1 above. (The scope of the research was limited to challenges brought in front of either 
the Supreme Court or the D.C. Court of Appeals).  
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in both Article II of the U.S. Constitution, as well in 5 U.S.C. §7301, which grants 
the President the right to prescribe regulations for the conduct of employees in the 
executive branch.47 
Executive orders are often issued on sweeping claims of authority by 
presidents, and as addressed earlier, in many complex cases it becomes difficult 
for the Court to untangle the validity of the claims. For example, of the 41 
executive orders issued by President Bush during the second year of his 
presidency, only 23 cited a specific statute.48 Similarly, of the 34 executive orders 
issued by President Obama during the second year of his presidency, only 15 of 
them had claimed a specific law as their source of authority.49 
A barrier to bringing congressional challenges of executive orders to the 
Court emerges from the fact that congressmen are often found to lack standing in 
these cases. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Raines v. Byrd (1997), 
which found that individual members of Congress did not have standing in 
challenging presidential action, many subsequent cases have been decided 
similarly.50 “[The] Supreme Court has dramatically limited or perhaps more 
accurately, all but eliminated, legislative standing for members of Congress.”51 
Examples include, Campell v. Clinton (2000), in which members of Congress 
lacked standing in their challenge to President Clinton’s use of U.S. military force 
in former Yugoslavia, as well as in Kucinich v. Obama (2011), where members of 
Congress lacked standing to challenge President Obama’s use of U.S. military 
force in Libya. This inability by congressmen to establish standing has sabotaged 
the efforts of Congress to challenge the President’s encroachment on the 
legislative branch’s authority. It has also provided ample opportunity for the 
Executive to abuse his power. 
 
The “Sole Organ” Doctrine 
 
Another reason why the Court has failed to articulate a clear jurisprudence 
on executive orders stems from its rudimentary approach to interpreting 
presidential direct action. This approach has been most common in cases where 
the issues involve foreign affairs. After the Court’s ruling in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Corp. (1936), the President has been widely regarded as the “sole 
organ” of the nation in the realm of international relations. Justice Southerland 
wrote that the President must be accorded “a degree of discretion and freedom 
from statutory restrictions which would not be admissible were domestic affairs 
                                                        
47 Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974). 
48 See note 1 above. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See note 6 above. 
51 See note 9 above at 70. 
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alone involved.”52 The decision in the case has been used to justify both broad 
delegations of legislative authority to the Executive and the exercise of inherent 
presidential power.53 Therefore, even when the validity of an executive order is 
challenged, and the parties are found to have standing, the tendency of the Court 
has been to interpret the initial acquiescence of Congress as favorable to the 
President.  
Only in the absence of a clear legislative record opposing the challenged 
presidential action will the Court abandon this simplistic approach.54 The case 
Goldwater v. Carter (1979), is a clear example that when an Executive is 
challenged by Congress on foreign affairs issues, the courts either conclude that 
the lack of initial confrontation by Congress means the President may carry on 
with his action, or they find that the issue is a political question and is therefore 
nonjusticiable.”55 When foreign policy-based executive orders are challenged, the 
understanding of the President as the “sole organ”56 in international affairs plays a 
large role in the Court’s decision-making. 
Scholars have often criticized this interpretation of the “sole organ” 
doctrine, but the Supreme Court has been generous in allowing for presidential 
strides for greater authority in international affairs. Louis Fisher, a Senior 
Specialist in separation of powers at the Congressional Research Service at the 
Library of Congress has written extensively on the decision in Curtiss-Wright. He 
argues that the “sole organ” doctrine articulated by Justice Southerland has been 
altogether misinterpreted from the speech delivered by then-Representative John 
Marshall. Fisher states that Marshall’s objective in calling the President the sole 
organ was to defend President John Adams’ authority to carry out an extradition 
treaty; the President was not the sole organ in formulating the treaty, simply in 
implementing it.57 Thus, the Court’s practice of attributing exceptional authority 
to the Executive in foreign affairs is misguided. Fisher states that, “Only after the 
policy had been formulated through the collective efforts of the executive and the 
legislative branches, either by treaty or by statute, did the President emerge as the 
                                                        
52 United States  v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (1936). 
53 Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President, University Press of 
Kansas (1991). 
54 See note 9 above at 70. 
55Goldwater v. Carter (1979) 444 U.S. 996. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that, 
“It cannot be said that either the Senate or the House has rejected the President’s claim. If the 
Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do so.” The Supreme Court, on 
appeal, found that, “the issue presented by this case is a nonjustiable political question which can 
never be considered by this Court.”  
56 Louis Fisher, Study No. 1 The “Sole Organ’” Doctrine, The Law Library of Congress, 8 
(2006). 
57 Ibid., at 7. Stresses the distinction between formulation and implementation of foreign policy.  
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‘sole organ’ in implementing it.”58 If Fisher’s arguments are true, they undermine 
the current Court’s entire jurisprudence regarding the distribution of power on 
foreign affairs between the two branches.  
Regardless of the criticism, the common interpretation of Curtiss-Wright 
continues to dominate the Court’s decisions today. Unsurprisingly, this broad 
delegation of legislative authority is most evident in the Court’s treatment of 
executive orders concerning foreign policy issues. A recent example of this 
emerged in the Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) case, in which the Supreme Court 
upheld the President’s authority over Congress in international relations once 
again. Citing Curtiss-Wright four times, the Court ruled that a congressional 
legislation requiring the State Department to record Israel in the passport of a U.S. 
citizen born in Jerusalem intrudes on the President’s authority to recognize 
foreign nations.59  
 
Judicial Abstention 
 
The lack of judicial review and the failure by the Supreme Court to 
articulate a clear doctrine regarding executive orders has also made it difficult to 
appropriately apply the limits set forth by the Constitution to the President. A 
comprehensive overview of the court cases challenging presidential direct action 
either in front of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court 
of the United States, revealed that checks and balances available to “temper 
executive action” are “inconsistently” invoked by the courts.60 This allows for the 
aggrandizement of the President and subsequently endangers the balance of 
powers that guarantees the stability of the nation. Louis Fisher warns: 
 
Under the best of conditions, the Supreme Court offers limited help in 
resolving the basic disputes of separation of powers. There are simply too 
many conflicts over issues that are not easily addressed in the court. 
Moreover, during the last two decades the Court has slipped back and 
forth in its search for principles, sometimes embracing a functional and 
pragmatic approach and switching later to doctrinaire, formalistic mode. 
With this confusion, the executive and legislative branches operate under 
unusual pressure to fend for themselves.61  
 
Judicial abstention in this area is defended by the argument that the respective 
political branches are equipped to protect their interests and keep other branches 
                                                        
58 Ibid, at 8. 
59 See Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State 576 US __ (2015).  
60 See note 1 above. 
61 See note 45 above at 57-58.  
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from encroaching on their rights. Nonetheless, the emergence of presidential 
unilateralism demonstrates the need for more oversight. The courts are often 
viewed as incapable of resolving national security and foreign affairs issues. 
However, as the examples from the Bush and Obama Administrations have 
demonstrated, the abstention by the Supreme Court has contributed to the 
inflation of the executive branch’s authority. 
Attempting to interrogate and interpret executive orders in the Supreme 
Court opinions is a gargantuan undertaking. A recent study from Yale Law 
School surveying the Court’s doctrine on executive orders, echoed the commonly 
held claim by congressmen and constituents that, “The resulting judicial elevation 
of executive order does not seem to take the form of a studied esteem for the 
President’s greater flexibility, expertise, or role in our constitutional system. 
Rather, it seems to be born of disaster.”62 Even though the Court has the power to 
review the contested presidential powers and determine whether or not a certain 
type of historical practice is valid, there continues to be a lack of reliable judicial 
review in this area.  
 
Conclusion 
 
While there has been some judicial review of direct presidential action, the 
Supreme Court has generally abstained from addressing issues regarding 
executive orders and their impact on the allocation of authority among in the 
federal government.63 This has led to the emergence of ambiguous jurisprudence 
on presidential directives. This form of judicial avoidance is primarily evident in 
questions surrounding the limits of presidential authority in foreign affairs. 
Additionally, even when the Court has agreed to review a challenge to an 
executive order, it has been inconsistent with respect to determining when a 
statute can preclude or invalidate it.64  
The Yale Law School study noted above concluded that, “This 
jurisprudence of executive orders may not derive from any coherent doctrine of 
presidential exceptionalism but instead from an under-theorized understanding of 
the role of executive orders and how they should function as part of our separation 
of powers.”65 This conclusion highlights that a clearer jurisprudence by the 
Supreme Court is needed to address executive orders, and the ways in which they 
have allowed the presidents to operate as monarchs. Unconstitutional actions, 
such as bypassing Congress and infringing upon its legislative authority, are going 
to continue in future administrations unless the Court clarifies its doctrine on 
                                                        
62 See note 1.  
63 See note 6 above.   
64 See note 1 at 1063. 
65 See note 1 at 2083. 
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executive orders. By eliminating its current simplistic practice, the Court will also 
be better equipped to determine the circumstances under which standing should 
be granted to Members of Congress when they present challenges to presidential 
directives.  
A closer examination of the asymmetries that have emerged as the result 
of the issuance of presidential directives is necessary. The Supreme Court must 
take note of the need for more complex and sophisticated approaches to 
interpreting the validity of executive orders. The motives of the Court in 
practicing avoidance are not clear, but the resulting inflation of presidential 
authority and the weakening of Congress are undeniable.  
Finally, two important questions regarding the vagueness of the 
jurisprudence on executive orders must be asked: Is the ambiguity meant to be a 
tool awarding the modern presidency with the flexibility needed to navigate 
today’s rapidly shifting world? Or is it a failure by the Supreme Court to realize 
the dangerous impact that unchecked presidential unilateralism has on the 
prosperity of the Republic? 
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